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How Do You Solve a Problem like (South) Korea?

how do you solve a problem like korea

U.S.-ROK Relations during the Carter Years Faltered over Troop Withdrawals, Human Rights, an Assassination, and a Coup

Carter Faced Pushback from South Korean Leaders and His Own Top Advisers

Washington, D.C., June 1, 2017  – President Jimmy Carter entered office in 1977 determined to draw down U.S. forces in South Korea and to address that nation’s stark human rights conditions, but he met surprising pushback on these and related issues from both South Korean President Park Chung Hee and his own top American advisers, as described in declassified records published today by the National Security Archive at The George Washington University.

Carter made no secret of his deep misgivings about Park’s suppression of his political opposition. When the two met for a summit in June 1979, Park attempted to turn the tables, lecturing Carter rhetorically: “If dozens of Soviet divisions were deployed in Baltimore, the U.S. Government could not permit its people to enjoy the same freedoms they do now.”

At the same time, senior U.S. officials including Cabinet officers tried to put the brakes on U.S. troop withdrawals and other policy initiatives such as holding tripartite talks with the two Koreas. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael H. Armacost complained to Defense Secretary Harold Brown before the summit that the latter was a “lousy idea,” a “loser” and “gimmicky.” The president faced similar resistance from a range of American officials on the ground in South Korea.

Carter was forced to postpone troop reductions for a time while continuing to press for political liberalization. But his challenge grew appreciably greater after Park’s October 1979 assassination by of the head of the Korean CIA, and a subsequent coup in December of that year by strongman General Chun Doo Hwan.

How Do You Solve a Problem like (South) Korea? The Carter Years

By robert a. wampler, ph.d..

It should be no surprise that events on the Korean peninsula have presented early challenges for the Trump administration. [1]  History shows that the combination of North Korean provocations and South Korean political crises has repeatedly confronted the U.S. with difficult policy choices. Previous electronic briefing books posted by the National Security Archive have addressed the limits of military options against North Korea [see  EBB 322 ], the difficulties in understanding Pyongyang’s actions and goals [see  EBB 421 ], and U.S. efforts to rein in South Korea’s nuclear weapons program [see  EBB582  and  EBB584 ].

For the Carter administration, the rocky course of Korean relations moved from the deep divide between Seoul and Washington created by Carter’s determination to withdraw U.S. forces and his criticism of Park Chung Hee’s human and political rights abuses, to the assassination of Park and subsequent military coup, followed by the rise of coup leader Chun Doo Hwan to the presidency and U.S. concerns over his authoritarian regime centering on the looming execution of South Korean political dissident Kim Dae Jung.

The historical backdrop to the documents posted here today can be sketched quickly. [2]  President Carter entered office in 1977 determined to draw down U.S. forces in South Korea, and deeply concerned about Park Chung Hee’s suppression of political opposition. Both of these issues imposed immense strains on the alliance during Carter’s term in office. Carter faced significant push-back on the troop withdrawal issue not only from Park, but also from his senior advisors, particularly his secretaries of state and defense, as well as senior U.S. military officers in Seoul, who seized upon new intelligence estimates that showed a much stronger North Korean military capability to argue against thewithdrawals. [3]

Following a tense and contentious summit meeting with Park in June 1979, the U.S. announced that further withdrawals would be put on hold until 1981. For his part, Park agreed to pursue increased military spending and to take steps to release political prisoners, though he continued to press the U.S. not to criticize publicly his actions against the political opposition, arguing that if given sufficient “running room” he would try to avoid “extreme” actions. (See Document 10)

Park would have little time to take any steps to address U.S. concerns, however, for on October 26, 1979, the director of the South Korean CIA would assassinate him during a dinner which was marked by intense and bitter arguments over Park’s handling of political discontent. In the aftermath of the assassination, once the identity of the assassin was determined, U.S. concerns centered on ensuring that this shock to the Korean political system did not result in political instability that could undermine democracy or tempt North Korea to further shake up conditions on the peninsula.

Hopes for an orderly political transition were dashed, however, when a group of “Young Turk” South Korean political officers, led by ambitious Korean Army general Chun Doo Hwan, staged a coup on December 12. In its aftermath, the limits on U.S. ability to influence political events in South Korea become ever more evident, as Chun, using his authority under martial law, imposed his own crackdown on political dissent, including the arrest of Kim Dae Jung, which was the spark that set off the May 1980 Kwangju uprising. The Chun regime brutally put down this uprising, and many South Koreans still see the U.S. as complicit in the crackdown because of claims made by the Chun government of U.S. support. Kim Dae Jung would be sentenced to death for his alleged role in fomenting the Kwangju uprising, and U.S. efforts to secure leniency for Kim would drive much of U.S. diplomacy with the Chun government (Chun, despite denials of political ambition, would be elected president in August 1980) until the end of the Carter presidency. It would be left to the incoming Reagan administration, which entered office determined to restore the alliance relationship, to finally secure commutation of Kim’s sentence. [4]

The documents posted here today come primarily from the Pentagon records of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and are supplemented by documents from the Digital National Security Archive collections on U.S.-Korean relations, as well as files obtained from the U.S. National Archives. As secretary of defense, Brown had the unenviable task of being Carter’s point man on defense issues in dealing with Park and then Chun. His role was to advance U.S. policy goals that were less than attractive to the South Korean leadership, as well as to advise President Carter on policy options that the president would find less than ideal.

Among the insights provided by these documents are these:

General John Vessey, the senior U.S. military officer in Seoul, described Park Chung Hee to new president Jimmy Carter as “a lonely man” who seemed to be “withdrawing more and more into himself.”  [Document 1]

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael H. Armacost  called Carter’s idea for tripartite U.S.-ROK-North Korea talks a “lousy idea,” a “loser” with “atrocious” timing with little chance of success, possibly “ginned up” by the White House PR staff as a Camp David-style TV “spectacular.” [Document 4]

During their summit meeting, Park lectured Carter on human rights: “If dozens of Soviet divisions were deployed in Baltimore, the U.S. Government could not permit its people to enjoy the same freedoms they do now. If these Soviets dug tunnels and sent  commando units into the District of Columbia, then U.S. freedoms would be more limited.” [Document 9]

Pentagon analysis of the situation immediately following Park’s assassination warned about the challenges facing the U.S. in trying to influence political developments towards greater democracy, arguing that the U.S., through “sensitive and judicious advice,” may be able to affect developments at the margins.  In the short run, Washington needed “to avoid even the appearance of manipulating a puppet.” [Document 11]

South Korean General Lew found it conceivable that a “temporarily deranged” KCIA Director Kim Dae Kyu had decided to kill Park, driven by fears he was going to be replaced because of his “incompetence.” [Document 12]

After the December 12 military coup, Ambassador Gleysteen’s gloomy assessment spoke of how U.S. “missionary work” to guide the new government “seems washed down the drain.” [Document 13]

One Pentagon official referred to coup leader Chun Doo Hwan as the “Pete Dawkins” of the ROK army, a reference to a well known Army officer, who served in Korea in the early 1970s, because of his rapid rise through the ranks and professional achievements. [Document 14]

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski warned the South Korean ambassador that Chun must avoid letting the Kim Dae Jung case drag out into a “no-win” scenario, noting that this had happened to President Zia in Pakistan when his hand was allegedly forced in the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto [Document 16]

Defense Secretary Brown gave a grim assessment of his final effort to persuade Chun to spare Kim Dae Jung in December 1980: “We have taken our best shot; I hope it is enough.” [Document 18]

*Thanks to Bill Burr for his assistance, especially for providing copies of documents 1 and 16.

READ THE DOCUMENTS

Document-01-Memorandum-of-Conversation-with

Document 01

RG 218, CJCS Brown Records, Box 3, Folder: 001 President/Vice President 1 August 1976 - December 1977

This memorandum records a quick review of the situation on the Korean peninsula provided to the recently-inaugurated president by General John Vessey, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea. It reveals a president who has many detailed questions about the military capability of North and South Korea, delving into discussion of specific weapons systems, South Korea's military development plans and the role the U.S. plays in these plans and the overall defense against North Korean aggression. The discussion is interesting for the way in which it foreshadows most if not all of the factors that would complicate Carter's desire to withdraw U.S. troops, given the way in which the U.S. commitment to South Korea's security was so tightly linked to issues of South Korean economic growth, seen as the essential foundation for increased military spending by Seoul, and Carter's interest in human rights. It is clear that Carter is probing for areas in which South Korea could take on more of the deterrent and defense responsibilities, and Vessey's briefing provided some hope for this goal in the future, given South Korea's growing economy and its force improvement plans, albeit couched in ways that made it clear that such a shift could not happen quickly. Vessey painted North Korea under Kim Il Sung as determined to reunify the peninsula under communism in his lifetime, noted Pyongyang's recent significant push to increase its military forces, and said it was U.S. forces that deterred war. Any U.S. force withdrawals would have to be carefully phased in line with the build-up of South Korean forces to avoid undermining this deterrent and the South's ability to defend against an attack. Vessey also provided a somber assessment of Park Chung Hee, whom the general admitted he did not know well personally. Vessey described the South Korean leader as a "lonely man," who seemed to be "withdrawing more and more into himself." Regarding Carter's desire to improve the human rights situation in South Korea, Vessey went to some lengths to tell how Park saw civil liberties as subordinate to the dictates of national security, and the need to understand the different political background in South Korea, which subordinated individual liberty to the good of society.

Document-02-Memorandum-of-Conversation-President

Document 02

Department of Defense FOIA request

This memorandum records a high-powered meeting bringing together South Korea's political and military leadership at the Blue House with Defense Secretary Brown, the U.S. ambassador to Seoul, the chairman of the JCS and the commander of U.S. forces in Korea. Not surprisingly, Carter's plans to withdraw U.S. forces and steps to counter the negative impact of this move are the main points of discussion. Brown's primary brief was to reassure Park about the U.S. security commitment. One step in this direction was Carter's decision to phase out the withdrawal through 1981-1982, and to leave over half of the 2nd Division forces in South Korea after the withdrawals. Other steps were the establishment of the Combined Command in Korea, and new security assistance to Seoul to help improve ROK forces through FMS credit sales of military weapons, no-cost transfer of military equipment and forces, and additional FMS credit over currently planned levels. All in all, the proposed U.S. aid (which would require Congressional action) would come to approximately $1.9 billion. Park welcomed these proposed compensatory steps, but insisted they must be 100 percent complete before the final withdrawal of U.S. forces, something Brown said he could not promise. Other steps Brown discussed included augmenting the number of tactical aircraft in South Korea, increasing the length, frequency and size of their joint military maneuvers, and assisting in the development of South Korea's military manufacturing.

Document-03-Memorandum-of-Conversation-Secretary

Document 03

At this meeting, Secretary Brown seeks to highlight what he sees as significant advances in the alliance relationship since their last meeting. Among the items he checks off are: the April 1978 adjustment in the U.S. troop withdrawal plan, showing Washington would conduct the withdrawal in a "careful and prudent fashion;" Congressional approval of legislation authorizing the cost-free transfer of equipment from the withdrawing forces; the increased size and tempo of joint exercises; expanded U.S. support to Korea's defense industry; the formal activation of the Combined Forces Command; and the continued coordination of U.S.-South Korean diplomatic efforts, especially with regard to any possible talks with North Korea. Looking ahead, Brown notes the need to emphasize to the American public (and thus Congress) the growing and equitably distributed economic prosperity in South Korea, and to persuade the South Korean public it should have no doubts about the U.S. security commitment. Congressional views are clearly a point of concern for Brown, who more than once notes the need for Congressional approval of U.S. plans to increase FMS credits to South Korea, other military sales, such as the F-16 aircraft, and co-production of military aircraft. Brown also sees signs for enhancing ROK security in international developments, such as the apparent cooling of Pyongyang's relations with Moscow, and the emphasis in Beijing on rapid modernization with the help of the West, which should increase China's stake in avoiding conflict in Korea. Park for his part is appreciative of all the steps the U.S. has taken to alleviate concerns raised by the troop withdrawal plans, which also demonstrated that North Korea could not take advantage of these withdrawals. He is not so sanguine about the impact of events on the wider world stage. Despite what Japanese and Chinese leaders said at the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty - that the treaty would result in a reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula - Park sees no such reduction and no sign Pyongyang wishes to change its policy, other than perhaps using the treaty to improve relations with Japan at the expense of South Korea. Park also worries about possible Soviet reactions to the normalization of China's relations with the U.S. and Japan, suggesting that Moscow may look to improve its ties with North Korea and tempt the latter to disturb stability in Northeast Asia. Park also warns Brown about building up China too much, reminding the American official that they are communists. In response, Brown tries to reassure Park that at present China serves to pin down Soviet divisions on their eastern front, and that the U.S. has no plans to sell weapons to China.

Document-04-Memorandum-for-the-Secretary-of

Document 04

Department of Defense FOIA Request

In an interesting foreshadowing of President Carter's role in the Clinton administration's negotiations regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program, Carter pushed for a U.S. initiative to broker trilateral talks among Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang during his summit meeting with Park Chung Hee in summer 1979. This initiative met fierce resistance within the administration, as seen in this memorandum from Michael Armacost to Harold Brown, which labeled it a "lousy idea," "gimmicky" and "substantially a loser," with "atrocious" timing. Carter wanted to send former U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib to Seoul to lay the groundwork for such a meeting, and Armacost presents his indictment of the proposal: it would make a "mockery" of policy-making processes; it elevates form over substance; neglects the need to create real inducements for Seoul and Pyongyang to enter such talks seriously, a need that Carter's troop withdrawal policy seriously undercuts by removing significant U.S. leverage; forfeits an opportunity to use normalization of U.S.-China relations to seek to engage Beijing into playing a productive role in such talks; it is highly unlikely Park would cooperate, given his existing concerns over Carter's policies and distrust of North Korea; and overall the move would only create doubts in Asia about U.S. goals and steadiness. To avoid this raft of undesirable repercussions, Armacost suggests that Brown talk to Brzezinski to find out what the White House really hopes to accomplish, fearing that it may be an idea "ginned up" by the PR people as a "TV spectacular" for the summit along the lines of the Camp David peace talks. Brown should make clear that such an effort would be "feckless" without prior discussions with Park regarding adjustments the U.S. was willing to make in the troop withdrawal schedule as part of an integrated effort to reduce tensions on the peninsula and work for "durable North-South peace arrangements.

Document-05-Memorandum-for-the-Secretary-of

Document 05

Korea II Set (Digital National Security Archive)

A key factor in rethinking Carter's push to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea was the production of new intelligence assessments of North Korea's military power. This memorandum, and the tables following, illustrate the nature of this reassessment and its impact on U.S. military planning for hostilities on the peninsula. The memorandum summarizes analysis and conclusions regarding South Korea's future defense programs reached by the Pentagon's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in connection with PRM-45, an overall review of U.S. policy towards Korea begun in early 1979. As the memorandum notes, the new intelligence re-estimate of North Korean ground forces indicates that these forces are about 70 percent stronger than estimated in 1977. This means that the U.S. might have to introduce substantial ground force reinforcements in a war to prevent defeat, a situation that would hold until 1985 given planned South Korean force improvements. To address this situation, Assistant Secretary of Defense Murray recommends that the U.S. substantially delay the planned withdrawal of forces, that it make strengthening South Korean forces one of the highest priorities, and that the two policies be linked. To this end, Murray argues that South Korean defense spending can be increased significantly, based on OSD and CIA economic analyses, and counter to what PRM-45 and the U.S. embassy and military leadership in Seoul held. In addition to taking steps to improve South Korea's military, Murray also suggests the Pentagon rethink its war termination policy for the peninsula. Current understanding is that an allied counter-offensive would stop at the DMZ, which weakens deterrence in his view. To address this concern, the U.S. should make clear that its reinforcements would have the ability to end any war on terms more favorable to the defense of Seoul than the DMZ, thus putting Pyongyang on notice that the "North would place its own territory at risk if it attacked the South.

Document-06-Charts-re-Reporting-on-North-Korean

Document 06

These two charts, one reporting on North Korea's military strength and the other providing a comparison of selected North and South Korea forces, illustrates the new understanding of the North Korea threat that emerged from the recently revised intelligence estimates. The first chart, which sets intelligence community estimates from 1970, 1974 and 1977 against 1979 CIA/DIA estimates, reveals significant increases. For example, the estimate of North Korean ground force levels increased by 150,000 between 1977 and 1979. Similarly, the number of divisions and brigades grew from 29 to 37, tank/assault guns from 1,900 to 2,800, and armored personnel carriers from 790 to 950. The chart comparing North and South Korean forces paints a similar picture, on the basis of current and projected South Korean force levels. In terms of ground forces, divisions and brigades, tanks or artillery/rocket launchers, the North is looking to enjoy a continued edge. It is likely that estimates such as these drove the interest in increased North Korean military growth discussed in the previous document.

Document-07-Memorandum-for-the-Secretary-of

Document 07

This memorandum lays out the arguments Defense Secretary Brown needs to make at the Foreign Policy breakfast ( a regular meeting between Carter and his Cabinet secretaries to discuss national security issues), held just a week before the Carter-Park summit on June 20 to secure President Carter’s agreement to pursue a trade-off under which the U.S. would adjust its troop withdrawal plans and South Korea would expand its defense efforts, particularly on ground forces. Secretary Brown was to meet with South Korean Defense Minister Ro on June 28, an opportunity to prepare the ground for the deal. The key driver and rationale for this move was the updated intelligence estimates of North Korean military capabilities, which, as Brown’s talking points enumerate, establish the need to reassess troop withdrawal plans and to develop new spending and military aid plans to support a new force expansion plan by Seoul. Brown expected Defense Minister Ro to be sympathetic to these proposals, but to secure Park’s agreement to these ideas, as well as to Carter’s call for trilateral meetings of senior U.S., South Korea and North Korea officials, Brown should be allowed to “foreshadow – on a close hold basis – the prospect” (emphasis in the original) for significant adjustment in the troop withdrawal plans. A key goal for Brown at the breakfast was to stress for Carter the linkage among these three major policy issues. As it was, Park remained cautious, and had conditioned his agreement to announcing any trilateral talks at the summit on a number of requirements: to ensure there were no bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks and that Carter disclose to the Korean leader the direction of his thinking on the troop withdrawal decision.

Document-08-Memoranda-of-Conversation-President

Document 08

Korea I Set (Digital National Security Archive)

This and the following memorandum capture the tension between Carter and Park during their summit meeting in Seoul. The record of their discussion reveals two leaders with very different agendas that made any real meeting of minds highly unlikely. Before moving into a private session (the subject of the second memorandum), the two leaders made lengthy opening statements. After expressing his gratitude for the U.S. security commitment to South Korea, Park moved quickly to make his impassioned case that the military situation on the peninsula made any withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea unwise, and buttressed this argument with extensive detail about the threat posed by North Korea. At the core of Park’s argument was his assessment of the grave threat a “most unpredictable” North Korea presented, especially in light of the new intelligence estimates of Pyongyang’s military might and North Korea’s history of armistice violations. In response, Carter made his case that the U.S. was continuing to stand behind its security commitments in the region. While acknowledging the new estimates of North Korean military power, Carter held that the planned troop withdrawals, which he characterized as on one-half of one percent of the total forces in Korea, did not present a real threat to the future security of South Korea, and hinted that part of the response to this should be increased South Korean military spending, especially given that the economic capacity of South Korea was much greater than that of North Korea.

Document-09-Memoranda-of-Conversation-President

Document 09

The discussion became more pointed in the private session that followed. Evidence that Park had not made his case with Carter is seen in the summary the U.S. president gave to the note taker about the opening discussion, in which Carter said he had been “taken aback” by the “adamant demand” that U.S. force levels not be changed, and that he was now waiting for Park to answer his questions about improving South Korea’s military posture. In the ensuing discussion, Carter would not promise to freeze U.S. force levels in the country, but would work with Seoul to address the force disparity on the peninsula. To this end, Carter pressed Park on South Korea’s economic ability to increase its military forces at a faster rate than forecast in current plans, at one point wondering how, if 6 percent of South Korea’s GNP equaled 20 percent of North Korea’s how had the latter’s forces built up so much more quickly than South Korea’s? The last part of the discussion turned to another contentious issue between the two leaders – human rights in South Korea, which Carter stressed was hurting South Korea’s public image in the U.S. Noting with approval Park’s actions to release some students and political activists, Carter hoped that Park would rescind Emergency Measure 9 and release as many prisoners as possible. Park’s rebuttal argued that Carter could not apply the same human rights yardstick to all countries, especially to countries whose security is threatened as South Korea’s is. Pointing to the proximity of the DMZ to Seoul and the North Korean forces posed to attack, Park recalled an analogy he had made to visiting U.S. congressmen: if dozens of Soviet divisions were deployed in Baltimore, and if the Soviets dug tunnels and sent commando units into Washington, D.C., the U.S. would need to curtail its political freedoms.

Document-10-Cable-Mike-Armacost-to-Deputy

Document 10

This cable forwards Secretary of Defense Brown's report on his discussions with President Park and Minister of Defense Ro while in Seoul for the U.S.-Korea Security Consultative meeting. The overall message is that the bilateral relationship seems to be getting back to a stronger and more stable basis. Brown's discussion with Ro reassured the South Koreans about the continued U.S. security commitment, despite recent revelations about the U.S. "swing strategy" to move significant naval forces from the Pacific to Europe in the event of a Russian attack on NATO. [5] The meeting with Park was also positive with respect to security relations, but was marked by continued tension over Carter's concern about human rights in South Korea, spurred by Park's actions against his political opposition and the imposition of martial law in Pusan. Both Brown and Ambassador Gleysteen warned Park about the impact on Congressional views about these actions and advised him to take steps to ease the political crackdown and seek accommodation with his political critics. Park replied that while he was ready to accept "private and informal advice" from the U.S. on these matters, he could not do so if the Carter administration publicly criticized him and took steps such as the recent recall of Ambassador Gleysteen. Such measures, he warned, risked a popular backlash against the U.S. for "dictating" to South Korea on clearly domestic issues. However, Park admitted that recent steps against the political opposition may have been "too harsh," and implied that if the U.S. gave him "enough running room" he would try to avoid extreme actions.

Document-11-Information-Memorandum-drafted-by

Document 11

The cautious optimism marking the previous cable was shattered a week later with the assassination of Park Chung Hee. This memorandum, prepared one day after the assassination, provides a window into U.S. efforts to determine exactly what happened on October 26, particularly who had actually shot Park - KCIA Director Kim Chae [Jae] Kyu or Presidential Security Force chief Cha Chi Chol. As the memorandum notes, the backdrop to the assassination was Park's sharp criticism of his senior advisors over their failure to keep him informed on the current political situation and the need to improve communications between the Blue House and the public as key to easing political discontent. While the U.S. tries to get a read on the immediate political situation, equally pressing is determining U.S. policy for the future political development of South Korea. Against any hope that the situation may open a route to a more democratic system, the embassy warns: "Nothing in Korea's long and turbulent history has prepared them to accept compromise as a political modus vivendi, and the continued severe North Korean threat also militates against a functioning western style democracy." Still, the U.S, might "be able to affect the flow of Korean events at the margins" in the direction of a more open political system. For the moment, the best course of action seems to be to remain cautious, see who emerges as potential leaders, and provide clear but discrete influence. In the short run, though, the U.S. needs to "avoid even the appearance of manipulating a puppet.

Document-12-Cable-SSO-Korea-to-SSO-DIA-Subject

Document 12

As this cable shows, General Lew Byong Hyon would be a key source of information regarding the assassination of Park and its aftermath. Lew was the senior Korean officer in the Combined Forces Command, and would serve as chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff under Chun Doo Hwan. The cable reports on a long, private conversation between General John Wickham, the senior U.S. officer in Korea, and Lew over dinner at Wickham's quarters on October 28 that provides a much fuller account of these events. As a handwritten note on the cable says, "This appears to be the most complete account yet, and in general believable. It includes some strange behavior, but some of that usually occurs in such circumstances." This account finally places the blame on Kim Jae Kyu for the assassination, and provides Lew's opinion regarding Kim's allegedly precarious professional and emotional state. As Lew sees it, Kim had been promoted despite his obvious shortcomings, largely due to his personal relationship with Park, until as KCIA director he reached the limits of his incompetence. Under pressure within the KCIA for his weak leadership and facing criticism from other close advisers to Kim, Kim possibly became "deranged," to use Lew's word, and decided to eliminate his persecutors. Looking ahead, Lew feared that "loud-mouths" like Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam would make provocative statements creating opportunities for dissension and making South Korea look weak in North Korea's eyes. Perhaps most reassuring for the U.S., based on Lew's account, the South Korean military, "for reasons not exactly clear at this time," had acted responsibly and in support of the constitution during the crisis and had played no role in the assassination.

Document-13-Cable-Seoul-18811-Amembassy-Seoul-to

Document 13

Once again, U.S. optimism about the political situation in South Korea and in particular military support for the constitution would be shattered, as a cabal of "Young Turk" military officers carried out a coup on December 12. This cable provides Ambassador Gleysteen's "groggy conclusions" about what he calls "a coup in all but name," leaving behind only the "flabby façade of civilian constitutional government." Washington Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer calls this the "bad news" cable and provides a good summary of Gleysteen's initial assessment. [6] What stands out is Gleysteen's sense that the U.S. has limited leverage to steer the course of events. Gleysteen and General Wickham would continue working to impress on the military and the civilian government U.S. concerns about the impact the coup might have on the political and security situation. Gleysteen admits that neither of them look forward to this prospect "because we all have been associated during the last six weeks with this type of missionary work and so much of it seems washed down the drain."

Document-14-Memorandum-for-the-Secretary-of

Document 14

Days after the coup, the U.S. was still trying to sort out the situation in South Korea, as seen in this memorandum from Michael Armacost to Harold Brown. Warning against premature conclusions, Armacost lists what is known: Chun Doo Hwan is calling the shots for now and the Army controls the real tools of power through new Cabinet choices. Armacost suspects that Chun will find it was easier to pull the military into the struggle to establish a new government than it will be to control the consequences of this step, which include the disruption of the orderly constitutional process to establish a new government, an opening to "clan politics," and a seeming indifference to U.S. reactions. Ambassador Gleysteen had met with Chun to underscore U.S. worries about the dangers of disunity in the military and its impact on North Korean reactions, the disruption of political liberalization and economic instability. Chun says he shares these concerns, and insists what occurred was neither a coup nor a revolution. Chun also claims he has no personal ambitions, supports political liberalization and expects unity to be restored in the military soon. Still, Chun realizes that supporters of the older senior military may seek vengeance, and that as the "fair-haired boy" of his class at the Korean Military Academy - Armacost characterizes him as the "Pete Dawkins of the ROK Army" [7] - he knows his rapid rise has created envy and resentment among his peers. Whether and how to support Chun in reestablishing unity and control in the military presents "extremely tricky choices" for the U.S., Armacost warns.

Document-15-Memorandum-for-the-President-from

Document 15

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Defense Secretary Brown brief President Carter on the situation in South Korea in this memorandum, which repeats many of the concerns discussed in the previous documents. The memorandum lays out three central goals for the U.S.: preventing a dangerous disintegration of Korean army unity; preserving the momentum toward "broadly-based democratic government under orderly civilian leadership;" and deterring any North Korean "adventurism." Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham have pursued these goals in their meetings with the new Korean government and General Chun Du Hwan, providing stiff warnings about the repercussions for U.S.-South Korean relations if there are any set-backs in the process of political liberalization and constitutional processes. For the moment, the situation is stable, with the greatest possible risk centering on new unrest or action by groups within the military. On the plus side, General Chun pledged to Gleysteen that the military would stay out of politics, a pledge also made by the new Army Chief of Staff. Also promising are the moves to drop indictments and prosecutions against opposition political figures and moves to grant amnesties for those affected by the abolished Emergency Measure No. 9, under which the late President Park had cracked down on his political opposition.

Document-16-Memorandum-of-Conversation-National

Document 16

RG 59, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963 - 1981, Box 3, Folder: Memcons October-December 1980, NARA

The U.S.-South Korean alliance managed to survive the crises of 1979, but 1980 brought new challenges, as noted in the introductory essay, marked by the rise of Chun to the presidency, the political protests against the new government, which reached their nadir in the Kwangju uprising, as well as the subsequent arrest, conviction and sentencing to death of prominent political dissident Kim Dae Jung for fomenting the uprising. The Carter White House had little leverage on this issue, as it would soon turn over power to the Reagan administration. Still, it continued to press the Chun government, as seen in this meeting between Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and South Korean Ambassador Kim Yong Shik to discuss the potentially serious damage to the bilateral relationship posed by the execution of Kim Dae Jung. The Korean ambassador could not offer much reassurance. The case would go to President Chun for a final decision soon, and given how complex and sensitive it was, Kim could not predict what Chun would do, especially given the strong pressure the Korean military was putting on Chun to execute Kim Dae Jung. Ambassador Kim also felt that the Western press, in its focus on the case, had failed to grasp a key point, which was that South Korea had survived an "extraordinarily difficult year" following the Park assassination, and had not become "another Iran." While taking these points, Brzezinski continued to press Ambassador Kim, advising the Korean government not to let the Kim Dae Jung case degenerate into a "no-win" situation such as had faced President Zia in Pakistan, who found himself unable to resist overwhelming pressure to execute Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. (The handwritten comments on the cover memo may have been by Leon Billings, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie’s special assistant, who had moved with him from the Senate to the State Department.)

Document-17-Memorandum-to-the-Acting-Secretary

Document 17

The constraints on the outgoing Carter administration's ability to influence the Kim Dae Jung decision are also underscored in this and the last document of this posting. In a memorandum to the acting secretary of state, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Michael Armacost (who moved over from the Pentagon) provides an update on the situation regarding Kim Dae Jung and options for a U.S. response should he be executed by the Chun regime. As Armacost reports, Ambassador Gleysteen recently had a good meeting with Chun, giving room for hope the Korean leader would commute Kim Dae Jung's sentence. An upcoming meeting between Chun and Secretary of Defense Brown (see last document) offered the "most authoritative" (and likely last) chance for driving home the costs South Korea would incur if Kim were executed. This, however, raised two policy issues: what actions was the U.S. prepared to take if Kim was executed; and how specific should the U.S. be in warning Chun of these potential repercussions? For Armacost, the U.S. faced the dilemma that while it had significant leverage with Seoul, specific acts carried significant downsides as well. For example, troop withdrawals could damage U.S. interests, while it would be risky to bluff about sanctions a lame duck administration could not impose. In light of this, Armacost advised there was virtue in keeping U.S. threats somewhat vague, while stressing the potential for a "major unraveling" of South Korean relations with the U.S. and Japan if Kim were executed. To prepare the acting secretary for a meeting with Secretary Brown before the latter met with President Carter to discuss the message that Brown should convey to Chun, Armacost provides a detailed analysis of possible economic, political and military sanctions, as well as suggested talking points for Brown to drive home the potential costs of Kim's execution. The list of actions Armacost believes Brown should signal to the South Korean leader include a "sharp, public condemnation" of the execution of Kim Dae Jung; recalling Ambassador Gleysteen for "extended consultations;" and steps to halt a range of economic and military financial aid to South Korea. In the final analysis, though, Armacost warns that the effectiveness of any such warnings will depend heavily on what the incoming Reagan administration is telling Chun in private. "To the extent we have been able to monitor these, they have been supportive."

Document-18-Cable-From-Seoul-to-the-White-House

Document 18

This cable reports on Secretary of Defense Brown's meeting with President Chun on December 13, where Brown made a "strong pitch" for commuting Kim Dae Jung's sentence. In line with Armacost's memorandum, Brown laid out the severe consequences of an execution for future U.S.-South Korean security and economic relations. Chun was not swayed, telling Brown that "The decision of the court must be respected. If the court confirms the death sentence that sentence should be carried out." Despite this seemingly hard stance, Chun also took pains to stress South Korea's deep debt to the U.S. and the importance of the bilateral relationship. Brown found it hard to weigh the encouraging and discouraging remarks, feeling they may have three possible meanings: despite recent signs that Chun is rethinking the issue and looking for a way to commute Kim's sentence without losing face, he has in fact decided to execute Kim; that Chun is looking to shift the onus to the courts by deciding Kim should be retried; or that Chun is "posturing" for his military audience, seeking to show he would not make concessions to the U.S. while playing for more time. Brown admits he does not know which of these is correct. All Brown is sure of is that a letter Carter sent Chun about the Kim case and Brown's presentation left no doubt regarding the strength of the U.S. reaction if Kim were executed, and that the Carter administration has made every effort to put across its point. "We have taken our best shot; I hope it is enough."

[1]  On the impeachment and arrest of Park Geun Hye, see “ South Korea Removes President Park Geun-hye ” by Choe Sang-Hun March 9, 2017; and “ Former South Korean president arrested in corruption probe, 3 weeks after impeachment ,” by Anna Fifield, March 30, 2017,  The Washington Post . On the election of Moon Jae-in, see “ South Koreans elect liberal Moon Jae-in president after months of turmoi l,” by Anna Fifield, May 9, 2017,  The Washington Post,  and “ On first day in office, South Korean president talks about going to North ,” by Anna Fifield, May 10, 2017,  The Washington Post.  On Trump and his administration’s response to North Korea missile tests and possible new nuclear tests, see “ Trump’s North Korea Standoff Rattles Allies and Adversaries ,” by Robbie Gramer and Paul McLeary, April 20, 2017,  Foreign Policy . The U.S. is pursuing ballistic missile defense systems as one possible way to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions in a way that is not dependent on diplomacy or sanctions; see “ Missile Defense Test Succeeds, Pentagon Says, Amid Tensions with North Korea ,“ Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, May 30, 2017, T he New York Times .

[2]  A good narrative history of the troubled course of U.S.-South Korean relations during the Carter years can be found in Don Oberdofer’s  The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History  (Basic Books, 1997, 2001), in particular Chapter 4: The Carter Chill, and Chapter 5: Assassination and Aftermath. Unless otherwise noted, this summary of the period draws upon Oberdorfer’s account.

[3]  In addition to Oberdorfer, Chapter 4, a good overview of the issues surrounding U.S. forces in South Korea can be found in William Stueck, “Ambivalent Occupation: U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, 1953 to the Present,” in  Trilateralism and Beyond: Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma During and After the Cold War , edited by Robert A. Wampler, Kent State University Press, 2012. As this essay shows, other presidents besides Carter have wanted to reduce the number of U.S. troops in South Korea, but political and strategic considerations have conspired to thwart these desires.

[4]  On the Reagan administration and the Chun regime, see  EBB 306

[5]  See “ The Secret ‘Swing Strategy’ ,”  The Washington Post , October 8, 1979.

[6]  Oberdorfer,  The Two Koreas , p. 119.

[7]  Pete Dawkins was a highly decorated U.S. Army officer and business man who was very well known by the late 1970s. He attended West Point, where he won the Heisman Trophy while playing for the Army football team (which he also captained), was president of his class, graduated with high honors and won a Rhodes scholarship, before embarking on a military career. Serving in Vietnam, then holding command positions in the U.S., he rose quickly through the ranks to retire in 1983 as a brigadier general. He also served as a White House Fellow in 1973-74. Following his retirement from military service, Dawkins began a successful business career involving senior positions at financial firms, including Lehman Brothers. In 1988 he made an unsuccessful bid for a Senate seat from New Jersey, running as a Republican; for further details on his career, see “Pete Dawkins,” Wikipedia article,  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pete_Dawkins .

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Opinionator | how do you solve a problem like korea.

how do you solve a problem like korea

How do you solve a problem like Korea?

  • Try negotiation with North Korea, not sanctions (“a policy option whose historical record is overwhelmingly one of failure”), write Donald Gregg and Don Oberdorfer on The Washington Post Op-Ed page. New sanctions on North Korea, which the Bush administration is “preparing to implement,” “would be a grave mistake,” they write. Gregg is a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and Oberdorfer is a former diplomatic correspondent for The Washington Post. They conclude, “In this case a U.S. administration will have to share the blame with North Korea if a new international crisis erupts.”
  • The New Republic has a new group blog, Open University , which features prominent academics chattering “about not just the news of the day but also the news from the academy ,” according to contributor David Greenberg, a Rutgers professor of history and media studies. The entire contributors list is here .
  • The Cato Institute’s Will Wilkinson, writing on his personal blog, says caucuses like those in his native Iowa are “a superior form of democracy” compared to primaries.

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How tiresome it is to see reported, day-after-day, that officials plan to “negotiate” this or that – or are being urged to negotiate. Negotiation requires each party want something from the other enough to be willing to concede them something else of comparable worth (or perceived comparable worth).

What, if anything, does N. Korea have that the US or other western nations want? The demise of the lunatic at the helm? First purchase rights for nuclear weapon shakedowns? A source of future cheap labor for S. Korean or Chinese factories?

And, what does N. Korea want from the US? Prestige? Respect? Food? Subsidies? Regime change? Casinos? Satellite TV?

What basis is there for “negotiation”? Obviously, there is nothing on the table that would make RNK give up nuclear weapons or missiles, so it’s simply not going to happen. RNK, however, would be delighted to receive everything else they want through “negotiations” that provide no changes to their own plans.

Until there are things of comparable value to negotiate, probably the best course is to continue to keep N. Korea isolated until the regime fails or is “saved” by China. China prefers having RNK as a buffer anyway – just as the US likes democracy in Mexico (not too much, but just enough to keep our powerful friends in power) buffering us from Venezuela, Peru, Colombia and other more socialist regimes.

Richard W writes as though he were privy to Kim il Jong’s thoughts and knows what he is planning. I spent some time in Korea and do not profess to have a clue. North Korea is reportedly starving. Kim needs assistance in this area and may prove to be amenable to a bribe. Who knows? The WH has not bothered to find out and by all reports would rather threaten Iran than deal with North Korea. Of course, we could just ignore Kim and eventually his regime might collapse for lack of an economy. I don’t think he is suicidal enough to launch a nuclear missile, so let him be.

It is perhaps stupid to recall that we as a country have never signed a treaty ending our war with (North) Korea, nor have we ever given them something they claim they wanted, namely a non-aggression pact. The negotiations done under the Clinton administration for a while delayed the nuclear development of North Korea; nothing like that has been attempted by Bush. I have come to the conclusion that Bush and Cheney are very hostile men, that war and killing is the only path they know, that they do not believe in diplomacy or strategic moves, and that as a result they go for the most drastic (apparent) solutions to all of the worlds’ problems, none of which, by the way, appear to have worked. This includes Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Lebanon.

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how do you solve a problem like korea

How do you solve a problem like Korea?

In February 2016, it seemed that China and the United States had reached the end of their tether with North Korea. The Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi agreed with the US Secretary of State John Kerry on a new UN resolution to tighten sanctions on Pyongyang. This was a reaction to two recent challenges: a nuclear test and a satellite launch. Since 90 per cent of North Korea’s trade is with China, which supplies everything from oil to internet and banking services, it has the greatest capacity to squeeze the regime and its support for sanctions is critical. In February this year, China announced a further measure: a ban on imports of North Korean coal, worth around $1bn a year. So it might seem surprising that China’s trading figures for the first quarter of 2017, a time when tensions have rarely been higher, revealed that its trade with North Korea had increased sharply: exports rose by 54.5 per cent and imports up by 18.4 per cent, compared to the same quarter last year. Seasoned observers, however, kept their surprise in check. It has long been evident that China’s effective stance towards North Korea is not really the strategic patience favoured by former US president Barack Obama’s administration, but strategic ambivalence. As well as trade, China gives diplomatic protection and a security guarantee under a 1961 treaty obliging it to defend North Korea in the event of an attack (an arrangement North Korea no longer seems to trust.) Beijing also works to prevent the regime collapse it dreads. Keeping Pyongyang afloat, by definition, implies maintaining the ruling Kim dynasty. With the murder of Kim Jung-un’s half brother in Malaysia in February, there is no obvious alternative to the incumbent, however troublesome. For China, this relationship is “as close as lips and teeth,” an expression that once signalled communist solidarity. Today it merely implies an unavoidable co-dependence. If the lips are gone, the saying continues, the teeth are exposed. If North Korea collapses, a nation unified under the terms of South Korea, a US ally, would be China’s immediate neighbour. For a country in the grip of its own muscular nationalism, that is an intolerable outcome. China’s border with North Korea is long and porous. It is one of the most used escape routes, although North Korean refugees often find themselves trapped in exploitation or sex slavery in China. It is also the border where China’s covert and overt support to North Korea is most visible. In the Chinese town of Dandong, near the mouth of the Yalu River, Chinese tourists gawp at the North Korean sentry posts on the other side. In the Dandong Border Economic Zone linked by bridge to the Korean town of Sinuiju, Korean workers bend over rows of sewing machines, making garments labelled “Made in China” for international markets. North Korea’s own special economic zone across the river turns out light industrial goods for China and recycles rubbish. Dandong epitomises China’s prescription for stability on the Korean peninsula: that Kim Jong-un should follow Deng Xiaoping’s development model, which has led China out of the Maoist doldrums to success in the global economy. It is a recipe for a kind of normalisation and, in China at least, the regime has so far survived the transition. There are signs that North Korea is following the plan: local markets have sprung up; farmers can sell their surplus privately and some factories can make their own supply and production arrangements, tentative moves from China’s 1980s playbook. The regime still has enough hard currency to import foreign cars for its well-dressed, privileged elite and to build new apartment blocks and leisure facilities in the capital, on top of financing its ruinously expensive military. But official relations between Pyongyang and Beijing are, paradoxically, at a historically low ebb. Both his father and grandfather visited Beijing regularly, but Kim Jong-un has never paid homage to his giant neighbour. The Chinese president Xi Jinping’s itinerary has taken him to Seoul but never to Pyongyang. Perhaps Kim is too insecure to leave home, or possibly keen to demonstrate that he is not, after all, dependent on China. A weak and isolated North Korea could easily become a virtual province of China. Conduct that is often interpreted as petulant or irrational, including the nuclear programme and extravagant threats to the US, help make the point at home that North Korea bows to nobody. The Kim dynasty’s god-like status is predicated on the myth that its founder, Kim Il-sung, heroically defeated the Japanese in the Second World War, then led his country to victory in the Korean War against the combined forces of imperialism. In fact, when, more than 70 years ago, two young US officers, alarmed at the Soviet forces’ rapid advance south, hastily drew a line across the peninsula at the 38th Parallel and the US adopted South Korea as a Cold War poster child for capitalism, Stalin installed Kim Il-sung in the north. He had spent most of his war in Manchuria and held a junior commission in the Soviet army. His rule lasted 46 years and on his death in 1994 he was succeeded by his son Kim Jong-il (though posthumously awarded the title Eternal President of the Republic.) On Kim Jong-il’s death in 2011, his son Kim Jong-un became leader. The Kim Il-sung legend has North Korea emerging from its baptism of fire as strong and unyielding as well-tempered steel. A continuing sense of threat, with its concomitant extreme nationalism and militarism, centred on the personalities of successive generations of the Kim family, is the bedrock of the regime’s survival. The nuclear programme, far from irrational, is the guarantee that Kim Jong-un and those around him will not fall to superior conventional forces, as did the non-nuclear leaders Saddam Hussein and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Kim knows that with China, Japan and South Korea within range of his missiles, the US is obliged to acknowledge that this nuclear capability raises the costs of military action against North Korea’s large, if poorly equipped conventional forces. Even if it fails to develop a nuclear missile capable of striking the US, the 47,000 US troops stationed in Japan are well within reach and Seoul is within artillery range. Kim’s rhetoric may be extravagant and his propaganda risible, but he follows his father’s example of playing a poor hand to maximum effect. South Korea, too, was a dictatorship in the post-war years, with espionage and propaganda to match the North in its virulence: defectors were—and still are—encouraged to tell stories of their suffering, and while undoubtedly there is much truth to this, some more extravagant accounts have been discredited. Today, South Korea’s official position is still that the two Koreas must reunite, but the preferred path to this has varied. For 10 years, the liberal presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun promoted the often criticised “sunshine policy” of peaceful engagement, encouraging investment and trade with the north. South Korean firms invested in mining, agriculture, tourism and manufacturing and an industrial park was built in the North Korean city of Kaesong, that employed some 53,000 North Koreans in South Korean enterprises. South Korea withdrew from Kaesong in 2016, but the “sunshine policy” ended in 2008. Since then, relations have been hostile. Now the election of South Korea’s liberal new president, Moon Jae-in may signal a return of the sunshine approach. As with China, regime collapse figures in South Korea’s nightmares. To be obliged to absorb a country whose most effective arm of the state is the military, steeped in hostility to the south, would be unthinkably complex. Like China, its best hope is a nuclear freeze and gradual normalisation through economic development. Unification, in Seoul, is like St Augustine’s prayer for chastity: desirable, but not yet. Of all North Korea’s difficult relationships, that with Japan has yielded the most bizarre episodes and the most intractable hostility. Geographically closer to China, Korea is culturally closer to Japan. The intensity of Kim worship recalls Japanese worship of the emperor in the early 20th century more, even, than China’s cult of Mao Zedong in his final years. The two cultures display a fraternal hatred, exacerbated by similarities. In North Korea, guides insist Korea is the original culture from which that of Japan is derived. In Japan, Korean residents suffer virulent discrimination. Memories of Japanese abuse and the humiliations of its 1910 annexation of Korea keep resentment active in both north and south. For Japan, North Korea’s bizarre kidnappings of several of  its citizens in the 70s—including a schoolgirl snatched on her way home—and the regime’s failure to account for their fate, renders normal relations politically impossible. North Korea’s military threat to Japan is growing: Tokyo estimates it has 3-400 medium-range missiles, some of which could carry nuclear weapons. This affects domestic politics in Japan, the only country ever to suffer a nuclear attack. Some demand the scrapping of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which renounces war, to permit Japan to acquire an offensive capability. Trump’s questioning of old alliances has set off more alarm bells in Tokyo. If the US is no longer a reliable friend, the argument goes, Japan has no choice but to rebuild its military capacity. This, like the US’s recent deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in South Korea, would raise tensions further with a China concerned with the region’s shifting strategic balance. As its defence ministry spokesman put it recently, “China opposes any actions by other countries to take the nuclear issue as an excuse to compromise the security of other countries.” Japan’s best hope—full de-nuclearisation—is also the least likely. One essential precondition would be a cast iron security guarantee for North Korea, backed by China. But a regime that thrives on paranoia will put little faith in promises that could be torn up by the next—or current—US president. Having cut back its economic ties, Japan enjoys little leverage and, like the US, now hopes China can force North Korea to agree to a nuclear freeze. One major imponderable is whether North Korea can develop an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile without outside help. Its submarine-launched missile programme, which has grown rapidly, seems largely home-grown, but there has been much assistance in the past, from Pakistan, Russia and Iran, as well as Chinese corporations, if not the regime itself. Japan is acutely aware that the Trump presidency adds alarming unpredictability to an already volatile situation and Japanese diplomacy has been in overdrive, with Shinzo Abe’s early visit to the US and obligatory round of golf with Trump. Japanese officials say that they welcome Washington’s commitment to the region. Behind the scenes, many have their fingers crossed, noting that both Kim and Trump make unrealistic claims to their domestic constituencies. Neither is noted for graciously backing down; both would wish to present any compromise as a victory over the other. All of North Korea’s neighbours are searching for a proposition that satisfies two lethally armed and unpredictable leaders in this most dangerous of situations.

Isabel Hilton is a London-based writer and contributing editor at Prospect

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Randy Rainbow: How Do You Solve a Problem Like Korea (and Dotards)?

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For virtually all of his seven years in office, President Obama has been able to put North Korea’s nuclear program on the back burner while he focused on Iran’s. That probably was the right priority. But during that time, North Korea has slowly, and consistently, become more — not less — of a threat. 

Even if it didn’t really detonate a hydrogen bomb this week (and that’s the initial assessment by the U.S. government  and a number of experts), it is aggressively working on its nuclear program. While its missiles have been wildly inaccurate, it also continues to develop technology that would allow it to target South Korea, Japan, U.S. forces in the Pacific — or the U.S. West Coast.

North Korea frustrated presidents Clinton and Bush, too. Obama has insisted it commit to ending its nuclear program before anything else happens. But his policy has plenty of doubters, as this piece  illustrates. The next president will have to find a way to deal with a country that doesn’t play by the same rules as the rest of the world. Its leaders don’t want to be part of the modern world or care about improving the quality of life for their people.

The approaches that work elsewhere haven’t worked here. But there are few alternatives: More pressure, up to and including the possibility of military action to degrade North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Or inducements to slow down its nuclear program, which would probably serve to strengthen the leadership and whet its appetite for more concessions.

For some time now, conventional wisdom has suggested that the road to Pyongyang goes through Beijing, North Korea’s closest ally and biggest trading partner. 

That was Donald Trump’s message  on Wednesday.

Having a cozy relationship with North Korea is embarrassing — like having Pigpen as your best friend. Relations have noticeably cooled since Xi Jinping took over as Chinese president: Unlike his father and grandfather, Kim Jong Un has not been invited to China.

China was angered by previous North Korean nuclear tests, and was very quick to condemn this one. But some analysts doubt whether China’s influence is as strong as it appears. The North Koreans appear not to have even told the Chinese they were going to conduct this test.

Even if they can, expecting the Chinese to do a lot more runs into some very tough questions of realpolitik.  As much as they’re irritated by the young North Korean leader, it’s probably still better to have him there than not. 

If North Korea suddenly collapsed, China would face a flood of refugees crossing the border and destabilizing the northeast part of the country. 

China would suddenly face the prospect of a unified Korea under control of the Seoul government. At a time when China is expanding its influence east and south, and seeks to replace the U.S. as the main Pacific power, this would be a major reversal. China would find itself bordering a country that is a staunch U.S. military ally, where American troops still are stationed.

Finally, the status quo may be useful for China. It can use its ability to pressure the North Koreans as a bargaining chip to gain concessions from the United States on other issues.

China is angry enough that it probably will go along with tougher sanctions against North Korea. But so what? If, as it seems, Kim and the rest of the leadership only care about their own survival, more external pressure just feeds the isolation and paranoia they use to rally the population behind them. It provides a justification for even more strident actions. 

Offering aid and other concessions would probably strengthen the leadership, as well, by marginally improving the economy. North Korea tends to do something provocative when it feels ignored. So dangling offers of assistance would reward bad behavior — and probably encourage another round of bad behavior to wrest even more concessions.

Either approach is a recipe for managing rather than solving the problem, essentially buying time and hoping North Korea becomes more reasonable. That might work, but it hasn’t so far.

What about military action, then? 

As anyone who has followed the debate over a possible military strike in Iran is aware, completely destroying a country’s nuclear infrastructure is highly unlikely. Delivery vehicles might be more vulnerable.

Nearly 10 years ago, Ashton Carter and William J. Perry   urged the Bush administration to conduct a surgical strike on a North Korean missile prior to test firing. Perry served as secretary of defense under President Clinton; Carter is currently Obama’s secretary of defense.

Carter and Perry argued then that even a failed test provided the North Koreans useful information, and that the cost of waiting would be far higher.

If the U.S. wanted to go that route, it would have to work hard to reassure the Chinese — or be prepared for a serious downturn in relations. It would have to make sure that the South Koreans and Japanese, who are far more likely to suffer the consequences, were on board.

All the same, it’s worth tucking this quote in the back of your mind. It’s from military analyst Thomas E. Ricks : “I would not be surprised if one of President Obama’s last acts in office were to launch a pre-emptive strike to degrade North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Hard to get the bombs, but easier to get launch mechanisms and the reprocessing facilities. The Pentagon plan back in 1994 was to use cruise missiles. I think we have better tools now.”

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28 Comments

holds the key – in the form of the only pipeline into North Korea. Shut off that valve, and the state ceases to exist. Nobody else can provide oil the them, and they don’t have any of their own. Of course, the flood of people then going to China is a huge problem, but if they want to really control NK, and be draconian, they can.

Now that song is stuck in my head.

Future for NK

I am not so worried about NK going after another country with their nukes as I am with them having some kind of accident and blowing up their own country and polluting that part of the world (and not just their own country) with radioactive fall-out.

Let the leadership stew in their own juices

George W. Bush named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as “the axis of evil.” We all know what happened to Iraq, which was accused of having weapons of mass destruction, but none were ever found.

I don’t think it’s a coincidence that the other two members of the alleged “axis” –I say “alleged” because Iraq and Iran have a long history of enmity and North Korea has little to do with either of the others–started making noise about nuclear weapons. They saw what happened to Iraq.

The North Koreans could not nuke Seoul, only 30 miles across the border, without both contaminating themselves with fallout and bringing down the wrath of the Western world. It would be a suicidal move. My impression on visiting South Korea in the summer of 2014 was that people there were less scared of North Korea than many Middle Americans are of attacks by ISIS.

North Korea has one of the world’s worst human rights records, but there is not a lot other countries can do about it until the North Koreans themselves get so fed up that they are willing to risk everything to overthrow the Kim family.

Good luck with that

“North Korea strictly prohibits the use, ownership, manufacture, or distribution of firearms by any citizen not serving in the military or special sectors of the government “executing official duties.” Anyone in violation of firearms laws are subject to “stern consequences.”

According to experts, gun laws were tightened by the late Kim Jong Il towards the end of his reign in an act to ensure control of society and maintain order for the eventual succession of his son Kim Jong Un.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overview_of_gun_laws_by_nation#North_Korea

Look at the histories of China and Romania

During the Maoist era and while the Gang of Four held sway after Mao’s death, anti-Mao forces hesitated to move, because they thought that the Gang of Four’s claim that they “had the hearts of the people” just might be true.

Then Zhou En-lai died in 1976. He had never approved of the Cultural Revolution, and he had a reputation for helping people who had fallen into the clutches of the Red Guards. Untold numbers of people went to Tiananmen Square and laid down memorial bouquets. The Gang of Four ordered the flowers removed overnight. When the residents of Beijing saw that the flowers were gone, they rioted. They outright rioted, despite having to face the guns of the Red Army.

Deng Xiaoping and other reformers saw that these riots proved that the Gang of Four were lying about their popularity, so they mounted a coup.

Deng and his colleagues were still authoritarians, but they were much more lenient than the Maoists.

I began studying in Japan in 1977 at a university that had a large population of Taiwanese students. They enjoyed watching NHK’s televised Chinese lessons, whose instructors were spouses and children of Chinese embassy officials. The Taiwanese told me that before Deng Xiaoping’s coup, the instructors all wore Mao suits and never cracked a smile. The week after the Gang of Four was overthrown, these same instructors appeared on TV in fashionable Western dress and hairstyles, smiling and joking.

This was accomplished without any of the common people firing a shot.

Remember, too, how Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown in 1989. It began when a member of Romania’s Hungarian-speaking minority gave an interview critical of the regime on Hungarian television. Since the interview could be seen in the border areas of Romania, that area erupted in riots protesting the official repression of the Hungarian-Romanians. On December 21, a crowd had been ordered to appear to listen to one Ceausescu’s speeches, and one brave person began chanting “Timisoara-Timisoara,” which was the name of the main city in the Hungarian region. Soon the whole crowd was heckling Ceausescu, and nothing he could say would stop them.

This made the anti-Ceausescu forces in the Romanian military realize that their compatriots would be happy to see Ceausescu go, so they moved against him on December 22.

Again, this was accomplished by a military coup without an armed populace.

Such a thing is less likely to happen soon in North Korea, but who knows? In the early 1980s, Jeane Kirkpatrick was distinguishing between “authoritarian” violators of human rights like the Latin American right-wing dictatorships and “totalitarian” violators of human rights, like the Communist countries. Her claim was that we ought not to bother with the “authoritarians,” because they would eventually reform on their own, while the “totalitarians” never would unless they lost a war. 1989 should have discredited her completely, but it didn’t.

Now we have present-day Jeane Kirkpatricks saying that North Korea can never reform on its own. They should show a little more humility. You never know what might set a population off.

Jeane Kirkpatrick

She was the American “Iron Lady,” talking straight talk that many wished to not hear; consequently, many tuned out and turned on the messenger. The international community did pay attention to her position and pronouncements. She was quite effective. She also served in a time when sharp-tongued women were denigrated or dismissed by custom and cultural repression. Certainly, we have grown beyond that, haven’t we?

Those who embrace Hillary Clinton’s rhetorical toughness regarding many current issues, might also embrace UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s no-nonsense approach to critical issues well above the perceptions of most of us typical Americans. Kirkpatrick didn’t play games other than diplomatic chess; nor, did she believe in strength through “please.” Many detractors did not like much she had to say. They did listen, however. She had style, substance and position.

Leadership is much about being clear and precise, not always cheerful and nice, and certainly not without spice.

Way to change the subject

Irrespective of her personality, Jeane Kirkpatrick had her facts wrong.

Just a few years after she made her pronouncements about “authoritarian” governments being amenable to change and and “totalitarian” governments being incapable of change, the Eastern European governments had all changed.

Suicidal Moves

Why do you think the North Korean leadership would balk at that? One worst-case scenario I have seen involves war between the North and the South. While the South would almost certainly win (especially given US assistance, and no comparable assistance from other nations for the North), the North would go out in a blaze of suicidal “glory.”

Brain Washing

Karen brings up a good point about NK human rights record (much of their population is suffering in work camps for the slightest infractions) and also the idea of overthrowing the Kim family.

However, after reading Suki Kim’s “WIthout You There Is No Us”, I believe the country is so brainwashed by those in power that they have almost completely lost touch with reality and have been disabled to overthrow the current “government” or stage come kind of coup.

What a possibility

Very interesting – I didn’t know that military leaders urged Bush to use force against North Korea and militaristic arrogant neocon Bush declined… Maybe if he didn’t, North Korea would have been in the same position as Iraq now is – with no chances to have nuclear weapons. And if Obama had guts to bomb Iran in the beginning of his presidency, we would have had a quiet and safe world with no or minimal problems and very few casualties compared to the current situation… Without Iran’s support, the Middle East spring could have succeeded (Assad would not have had a chance) and Israeli-Palestinian peace could have become a reality (Hezbollah and Hamas would have been history and Palestinians would not have had a choice but to agree to Israel’s offers which would not have been that afraid to make them). Too bad our presidents lately do not have guts to do the right thing.

If the Right Thing Had Been Done

Let’s pretend the gutless George W. Bush would have made a military strike against North Korea. What would have happened? Perhaps they would have sat by idly, and the people would have concluded that the Kim regime was no longer in their best interests. Everything would be ginger-peachy, am I right?

A more realistic scenario: North Korea fights back, and does so with every resource at its disposal. The peninsula is consumed by a bloody, destructive war. Seoul–which is only 35 miles from the demilitarized zone–would have been turned into a smoking ruin. One of East Asia’s economic and political success stories would be destroyed, and probably rendered uninhabitable for generations, all so the President of the United States could show he had some backbone.

As far as the bombing of Iran goes, that comment scarcely merits a response. Do you really think that the presence of Iran was a major factor in the failure of the Middle Eastern spring? Is Iran really the stumbling block to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians?

There is also the broader conflict between the “guts to do the right thing” and international law (see, loss of national legitimacy and negative opinions engendered by violations of), but that’s another matter.

Timing of Possible U.S. Action

Mark’s final paragraph raises a timing issue perhaps to our advantage, if we truly believe neutralizing NK is to our collective regional advantage. Given China’s significant financial stress right now–this year, this week, and likely worsening–including serious conjecture of currency devaluation, China might not now be an obstacle to the NK solution(s) we have deferred.

If we are really “pivoting to the West,” this year might be the right time to punctuate that promise.

It’s a gutsy call, and timing is everything, but opportunities are also fleeting. Decisive action in North Korea might possibly alter some Middle East metrics, as well. I just hope whatever is decided is done without press leaks and media polls.

It’s like trying to play three-dimensional chess on cracked plastic.

Timing and pivoting

Personally, when we attacked Iraq, I was completely baffled at pivoting from Afghanistan at all, let alone toward Iraq. If we were going to concern ourselves with any other country at that time, the obvious target would have been North Korea. But that would have been a bad time. Of course, so was Iraq, if there ever was a good time for Iraq. I’m as close to being a pacifist as you get, and even I was ok with Afghanistan becoming a sea of glass if it meant we could destroy Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. And pivoting at all at that time was a bad idea, let alone to one of the stablest places in the Middle East (even if the leader was a Very Bad Man).

So, is it time to pivot now? Maybe? We’re still entrenched in the mess that is Iraq, and the joke that is Israel/Palestine/Syria. BUT, China is slowing down as an economic power. China needs to focus on stabilizing as they transition from aspiring middle class to stable middle class, or they might miss their window on that. With North Korea acting like a spoiled child with a big bully (China) having their back, China risks its status as a credible world power by letting Mr. Kim unleash so much insanity. On the other hand, if we wait for China to recover before pinching off NK’s supplies, it seems almost inevitable that NK would be annexed with little power by anyone else to stop it. That wouldn’t be good news for much of the region, let alone our South Korean allies.

So, yeah, it’s complicated, but it might just be time to pivot. We shouldn’t be the body, but only the pivot point, though. North Korea WANTS us to attack them, much like ISIS, so they can prove that we’re the evil bullies they’re claiming us to be to their people/recruits. There’s nothing more unifying than a common threat.

Maybe a Window

I like your continuity of thought, Rachel. I do believe we may now have a strategic opportunity regarding North Korea. China is not the current reason for restraint, as in past decades when China had little trade or diplomatic relationships with Western powers. The metrics now seem better, and we now seem to better understand them.

Chine likely could remove Kim if we show them the favorable calculus. Japan and Philippines must also be considered in any strategy, of course. Let’s hope the Obama Administration can take advantage of these current alignments and take some acceptable yet decisive action this year. Let’s see if anything comes of these considerations.

I would hope my country would have at least learned from its late experience in the Middle East not to offhandedly launch attacks at other nations, certainly not those that despite crushing economic problems manage to maintain millions of soldiers and thousands of artillery tubes in range of one of our allies’ capital cities. Remember when we were going to overrun all those tanks out in the desert and all we needed to bring was lots of trucks to haul away the rose petals the grateful liberated residents would be throwing at our brave warriors? War in mountainous North Korea would make the Iraq debacle look like a Sunday school picnic.

Sitting down and talking with North Korea is the best of a set of bad options. The moment we need to capture is not one where we set off another costly war we cannot win with another hermetic, sociopathic, totalitarian regime; it is one where we catch that regime in a mood to trade its Potemkin nuclear program for something that might give it some actual security and possibly start it participating in the life of the larger world around it. With luck, next time we won’t welsh on our own bargain like we did with North Korea in 2001.

I can’t resist posting the “military expert’s” paragraph preceding his suggestion to let slip the dogs of war. He is obviously whatever the opposite of serious is:

“In other news from NoKo, one of L’il Kim’s top aides died in a car crash. I guess it beats being perforated by an anti-aircraft gun. And no. 2 back, thoroughly re-educated. They also blew off some sort of big bomb yesterday.”

That is like the joke about the headline in the Boston Herald after New York City got nuked, “Hub Man Killed in A-Blast.” Except that it’s not funny. Not funny at all.

Nice to Read New Submissions

Mark really knows his stuff, writing with responsible observation of foreign affairs based on many years of experience. He is exactly the caliber of columnist needed here to provide solid background for thoughtful comments. He truly elevates discourse. Please follow him and freely submit well-considered comments, elaborations and personal knowledge.

Certain other writers seem to attract shallow potshot artists, or those simply making their regular strafing runs. Not Mark. Let’s keep his contributions at the level they deserve by continuing to bring sophisticated comments to this space.

Thanks for joining these pages and helping produce thoughtful threads.

Whose suggestion?

Mr. Holbrook, you probably didn’t notice but I based my opinion on the advice of the top military leadership of our country so I would guess that they thought of the possibilities that you mentioned. On the other hand, I can appreciate your praise of President Bush – it is rare to hear it from the left. As for Iran, of course it is a stumbling block in the peace between Israel and Palestinians. Don’t you think that a party that supports the most evil terrorist organizations that constantly attack Israel on Palestinian behalf may have a strong effect on both Israelis and Palestinian thinking?

Mr. Gray, I can only repeat myself here: If top military leadership suggested attacking North Korea, they most likely thought of all the problems you mentioned (remember that was after the Iraq war). As for Iraq war itself, it was a quick and decisive victory with minimal casualties which was spoiled by a very bad political decision to stay there and help Iraqis – why do people keep forgetting about those things? I also wonder if you have ever lived in a totalitarian country because if you did you would not hope for them to be in the mood to trade anything…

i wonder…

When Carter and Perry suggested a strike against North Korea they were not “top military leadership” but rather university professors. “Top military leadership” at the time opposed the idea. If a dispassionate review of the history doesn’t convince you, I could assure you from personal knowledge (service in the US State Department’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs during the first North Korean nuclear crisis) that “top military leadership” at the time was well aware of the very real costs of any military action against North Korea and was hardly enthusiastic for such an undertaking.

I also wonder what color the sky might be in the world where the US debacle in the Middle East that nearly cost it its position as a global superpower could possibly be described as “a quick and decisive victory.” Perhaps you could enlighten me on that.

Yes, victory

Mr. Gray, “Perry served as Secretary of Defense and Carter as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration” (from that article) so they were “top military leadership” as I said, though not at that time, which means that they were qualified to consider, and dismiss, all potential problems of such a strike. And Mr. Carter is also a current secretary of defense…

Iraq war started on March 20, 2003 and Baghdad was captured on April 12, 2003. Fewer than 200 coalition troops were killed. Saddam was captured in December 2003. Doesn’t this constitute “clear and decisive victory?” Whatever happened after that was not a part of the war but a part of a ridiculous attempt to build a democracy in Iraq which is a completely different thing. If America withdrew its army after Saddam’s capture, it would have been a great success making America much stronger for a very long time

flaming success

By those criteria the W Administration was a flaming success, since if it had never invaded Iraq in the first place there would have been no Great Recession and we would not now be fighting ISIS at home or abroad. Unfortunately those who have to deal with the North Koreas of the world in a serious way also have to deal with the world as it exists, not as it might be in some alternate reality.

Potential success

No, Bush administration was not a success exactly because of a mistake of staying in Iraq but not because of attacking it. The logical conclusion from the facts I presented would be that it is OK to attack North Korea but we should not be staying there to build a democracy there – that should be their problem; our task should be to remove the danger of nuclear weapons from North Korean regime and nothing more – the same as it should have been the only task in Iraq war (which, by the way, was achieved). So please re-read my post: Bush would have been a success if it did not STAY in Iraq, not if it did not invade Iraq.

Military Leadership

What do you suppose the actual military leadership thought? I’m not talking about defense-wonk academics and former high-ranking Pentagon officials, but the folks in uniform who would actually be doing the military striking? Did anyone ask their opinion?

“On the other hand, I can appreciate your praise of President Bush – it is rare to hear it from the left.” Even a stopped clock is right twice a day.

“As for Iran, of course it is a stumbling block in the peace between Israel and Palestinians.” When Iran was a client state of the US (Or was the US a client of the Shah, installing him and propping him up as his regime turned increasingly authoritarian? Opinions differ), the Palestinians and Israelis were at loggerheads. The presence or absence of Iran seems to matter little.

Who is right

Mr. Holbrook, people who wrote that were past and FUTURE military leadership, not just wonks.

So Bush was right twice. When were Clinton and Obama right (let’s limit it to international affairs for now)?

Even though this is actually off-topic here, but I never said that Iran was the only stumbling block. I just said that it would help if it were not there…

Twice Right

I think you are reading a bit more into that homely phrase than was intended.

I fail to see what the records of Clinton or Obama have to do with whether Bush made the right decision in not invading North Korea.

Sound of Music

This, Mark, is to let you know one reader caught your titular bow to Rodgers and Hammerstein.

Well done, sir!

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Randy Rainbow asks, ‘How Do You Solve A Problem Like Korea?’

Randy Rainbow North Korea

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How do you solve a problem like Korea?

A nalysis of the North Korean nuclear test has thus far focused on the predicament the test puts the Obama administration in . The United States is unsatisfied with the status quo, but frustratingly lacks the tools to change the situation. Not enough attention has been paid, however, to the problem that North Korean brinksmanship has created for China.

For some time, China has been content to allow North Korea a degree of latitude, while trying to avoid the worst-case scenarios of war or North Korean collapse. As North Korean behaviour becomes more erratic, the US, South Korea and especially Japan have greater incentive to take aggressive stances that could endanger China's interests in Northeast Asia. The desire to forestall a militarised Japanese response to North Korea could incline China to take a harder stance against North Korea and provide an opening for Sino-American cooperation.

Aggressive North Korean behaviour has unnerved Japan. Last week, prior to the nuclear test, a Liberal Democratic Party panel suggested that Japan should develop the capacity to launch pre-emptive strikes against prospective enemies. This is consistent with the more assertive military stance that Japan has taken in recent years, such as the deployment of warships to the Indian Ocean, and the development of sea-based missile defence. The nuclear test will only give more ammunition to Japanese hawks who wish to alter Article 9, which limits Japan's military to defensive options.

Japan is unlikely to develop its own nuclear forces. As the only people to fall victim to atomic attack, the Japanese have strong cultural reasons to resist nuclear weapons. Moreover, Japan takes non-proliferation very seriously, and has historically been a strong supporter of the international institutions that undergird it.

However, Japan can increase the size, capability and purview of its conventional forces sufficient to make China nervous about its position in east and northeast Asia. Historical concerns aside, Japan has the economic and potential military capability to create problems for Beijing's regional aspirations. The long-term US relationship with Japan serves to keep Tokyo in check, which is fine with China. An aggressive North Korea, however, may make this status quo untenable.

As long as North Korean behaviour was tolerable, China faced a situation in which it would bear many of the costs of a North Korean collapse, while reaping few benefits. The regime's collapse would create massive refugee problems on the Chinese border, with attendant concerns about the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology.

In the future, however, North Korean brinksmanship will become increasingly costly for the Chinese. This creates an opportunity for cooperation between China and the United States.

China's relatively close relationship with North Korea means that Beijing likely has a clearer understanding of the internal situation of the Pyongyang regime than the United States. China probably has a better notion than the US of the balance of power between factions in the succession crisis, and a better idea of which levers to pull in order to strengthen one faction over another.

China and the United States do not have identical interests. It's unlikely that the Chinese have much appreciation at all for North Korean human rights. China also still has some residual concern about the prospect of a unified, democratic Korea, but China has relatively good relations with Seoul, and China-South Korea trade and investment dwarf China's economic interest in North Korea.

China cannot "solve" the North Korean problem on its own. Beijing does not wish to risk a North Korean collapse, and has limited tools with which to affect North Korea policy short of a complete embargo. Nevertheless, the status quo does not work to China's benefit. As long as North Korea continues to test missiles and nuclear warheads, hawkish forces in Japan will grow stronger.

A re-armed, assertive Japan is a bad scenario for Beijing, perhaps even worse than the collapse of the Pyongyang regime. Although the US and China don't have identical interests, they share enough of the same fears to make some cooperation possible. Put bluntly, there is no way to manage North Korea without Beijing's assistance , and Beijing has a strong incentive to facilitate a manageable situation.

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How do you solve a problem like north korea 3 viewpoints.

People watch a television broadcast on North Korea.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's brinksmanship is in full bloom. He's ordered the missiles prepped, dismissed the armistice, and announced plans to bring a nuclear reactor back on line .

The U.S. response -- a restrained show of force by fighter jets and warships, along with comments that simultaneously decry and downplay the threat -- has not stopped the threats.

( Read More : North Korean Leader Dials Down Hostile Rhetoric )

Foreign-policy analysts agree the situation is troubling, though there's a deep difference of opinion on what approach would convince Kim Jong Un to play nice.

The U.S. routine of flexing its muscles whenever Pyongyang lobs another threat is Washington's way of playing right into Kim Jong Un's hands, said Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Like many a parenting expert, he believes the White House should react to North Korea's bad behavior by ignoring it.

The fighter and bomber flyovers meant to show the U.S. means business "just reinforces their behavior," Bandow said. "It gives them attention, showing how this bankrupt, starving country can get a response from the great superpower.

"We are acting as if we are worried about them. To my mind, the response should be, 'Who? Oh, THEM.'"

Yes, Kim Jong Un could respond to the cold shoulder by ramping up the provocations to get some kind of response, but he's already used up so many that "at some point it's hard to imagine what new threats he could make," Bandow said.

( Read More : North Korea to Enter 'State of War' With South Korea )

Photos of Kim Jong Un surveying U.S.-bound missile routes aside, Bandow finds it hard to believe that he's truly the supreme commander "with the power by himself to careen off into war."

"There's nothing to suggest they're suicidal," he said of the regime. But "it's easy to make a mistake" when tensions are escalating fast, he added.

The solution is for the U.S. to disengage. "Why is North Korea our problem?" he said.

Ignoring the threats would be a terrible mistake, according to Gordon Chang, author of "Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World," who says the U.S. should be stepping up action against a nuclear-capable North Korea.

He said B-2 bomber and F-22 Raptor overflights should continue, if only to send a message to the South Korean public, which is increasingly losing confidence in America's ability to defend them and pushing for Seoul to develop its own nuclear program, which would destabilize the region.

The time has come for stepped-up interdiction of North Korean shipping and aircraft movements, to stop them from selling nuclear technology to Iran with the cooperation of China, he said.

( Read More : Chinese Editor Suspended for Article on North Korea )

And Chang said the Obama Administration should be driving a wedge between North Korea and China, by telling Beijing there will be consequences if it continues cozying up to Kim Jong Un. "North Korea would not be making these threats if they felt like the Chinese were going to clamp down on them," he said.

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Chang does not buy the argument that North Korea doesn't have many more tricks up his sleeve, noting that he could make good on his threat to shut down the jointly run Kaesong Industrial Region, the main symbol of cooperation with the South.

The U.S. should one-up Kim Jong Un's declaration that the armistice in place for 60 years has been replaced by a state of war -- and agree that the armistice is over, so the U.S. is legally able to use force.

"That would shake up the North Korean regime," he said. "It would show there's a new attitude in Washington."

"What I argue for has very substantial downsides, but they are the least worst solutions," he added. "Nobody wants to provoke a crisis but it's that type of thinking that got us into this situation."

Little more than a year into the job held by his father and his grandfather, Kim Jong Un has managed to paint himself into a corner -- and the U.S. needs to give him a way out, says Han Park, a University of Georgia professor who has served as an unofficial negotiator in North Korea.

Because he has not consolidated his power at home, the fledgling leader cannot back off. "There has to be a face-saving device," Park said.

"Sanctions will not work. They have never worked," the professor said. "It will aggravate the North Korean leadership even more."

( Read More : As Sanctions Tighten, North Korea Threatens Combat )

Now that it has some nuclear capability, Pyongyang will not relinquish it unless its security is assured, he said. And the only way to do that is bestowing diplomatic recognition on North Korea and working toward a peace treaty.

Without good-faith talks, Kim Jong Un will stay on a collision course with the U.S.

"Military confrontation would be unthinkable, but unthinkable things can happen," Park said.

There's no question North Korea would be on the losing end of a conflict, he said. Regardless, "war is something that we cannot afford."

Giving North Korea peace? What's wrong with that?" he said.

How do you solve a problem like (North) Korea?

  • By David Case

how do you solve a problem like korea

BOSTON — Kim Jong Un detonated a nuclear weapon at North Korea's Pungyye-ri test site on Tuesday. The test appeared to be more successful than the two previous explosions. And it involved a " lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force," according to North Korea's news agency.

Dramatic, but let's face it: North Korea's nuclear ambitions are hardly news. So why does this latest test matter, and is the world really more dangerous today than it was yesterday? GlobalPost asked global security expert Dr. Jim Walsh, one of a handful of Americans who has traveled to Iran and North Korea for talks with officials about nuclear issues. Dr Walsh is a Research Associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program (SSP), and a scholar at MIT's Center for International Studies . This interview has been edited for clarity and length. Why does North Korea’s nuclear test matter? Why should Americans care?

Let’s not give North Korea more credit than it deserves. The test is not a game changer. But yes, the world is more dangerous today than it was yesterday, in two ways.

First, it appears North Korea has made a decision to build long-range rockets and miniaturize a nuclear warhead, small and light enough to be carried by a missile. They haven’t achieved that yet, and they may never get there, but they’re trying. Today’s test was a step in that process. We’ll know a lot more about the test in a week, once data from aerial sniffers reveal what material was used. Was it plutonium, which they’ve detonated before? Or was it highly enriched uranium, or a combination of the two? Second, the four leading regional players all have new leadership: China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan. So there’s lots of uncertainty. The test plays into nationalist sentiments in Japan and elsewhere. It’s dangerous to have provocations when you have lots of inexperienced leaders at the same time, where things might get away from them and end up in a spiral that no one actually wants. What does this say about Kim Jong Un? What does he hope to achieve from detonating a nuclear test? Initially there was some speculation and some hope that he would be a reformer. The truth is, we really don’t know. There’s not much humility when people analyze North Korea. But it’s important to remember we know very little about it. That said, you could imagine that he has lots of reasons for conducting the test. You’re right to say that we’ve had mixed signals from him. This is a guy who had Disney-like figures at shows that he attended. He admitted that their first missile test had failed; We’ve never had that kind of frankness before. He’s more public, and has talked about reenergizing the party, which has been dead for years. Yet there’s also this rhetoric, as well as the rocket and nuclear tests. It’s hard to put it all together. He’s newly installed, so he gets credibility for this. He can claim that North Korea is more advanced than South Korea. Yes, South Korea has a bigger economy and better military, but the North has had nuclear tests and South Korea hasn’t. This may be a way to buy support from the military in a country whose slogan is “military first.” I assume that his main goal is to hold onto power. So if Kim Jong Un is indeed a reformer, he has to find ways to foster change without causing a revolt. That means taking power away from the military or putting his own people in the military while he builds up the party. He probably wants to enact economic reform, because he doesn’t want the country to crash and burn. They’ve tried that before and messed it up so badly that, during the currency reform, an official was shot. Economic reform in a totalitarian state is tricky business. What are the Obama administration’s options for responding to the test? All the options are unappealing. We’ve had the strategic patience policy for five years. I understand why we had it with the last nuclear test in 2009. We don’t want to reward bad behavior. But that policy failed. There were provocations followed by sanctions followed by provocations followed by sanctions followed by provocations. On the other hand, Obama’s critics, mostly on the right, argue that the president’s policy has failed so let’s do more of it, i.e, more sanctions. So I don’t expect much to change here. I think both sides are sort of dug in. Sanctions will never force North Korea to collapse because China will never let that happen. It doesn’t like North Korea, but it doesn’t want a collapsed state on its border. In recent weeks China urged North Korea not to go ahead with the test, but Kim Jong Un went ahead with it anyway. What does this say about the China-North Korea relationship, and how is Beijing likely to respond? China’s going to react negatively but it’s got to walk the line. If it doesn’t respond it will look weak in the face of its recalcitrant friend. But if it tries to enforce some penalty and North Korea responds with more provocation that will also make China look weak. At the end of the day, if there’s going to be diplomacy that leads us down a different path, China will need a really good relationship with North Korea. China’s the only one in the six-party talks that can guarantee that North Korea will get what it has been promised. If North Korea doesn’t trust China the six-party talks become five against one and there will be no hope for a diplomatic resolution. For China, the North Korea problem is only going to get worse. I don’t know what they’re going to do. But the options are not good. The international community’s hands have long been tied militarily because North Korea’s  artillery poses an imminent threat to Seoul. Is there a strategic option for surmounting this predicament? I don’t expect North Korea to launch a suicidal attack on South Korea. The South Korean military is better than the North’s, even without having the US as an ally. North Korea would lose any war decisively, but you’d have a big hole ripped into South Korea, and that’s enough to deter a South Korean preventive strike. So if the North isn’t going to invade the South – because they’ll lose and die – and the South isn’t going to invade the North – because they’ll win, but it’ll be really costly — then how does war happen? War happens because someone miscalculates, adopts military doctrines that leads to escalation - that’s how you get conflict, and I think there’s a chance of that. Does this nuclear test affect international efforts to stop Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons? For the most part these are separate stories with separate groups of actors driven by different things. You know how I said China could at least in theory guarantee things for North Korea? There’s no player like that for Iran. There’s no one who can step in and guarantee that Iran will get what it needs out of an agreement, because everyone hates Iran. What’s more, the crux of the problem is different. Iran had a nuclear weapons program, and shut it down in 2003. Now, it has a very active enrichment program – more active than it would need – but it has not made a decision to build a nuclear weapon, whereas North Korea has clearly built nuclear devices.

Follow GlobalPost senior editor David Case on Twitter:  Follow @DCaseGP

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COMMENTS

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